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Title: Political Judgment beyond Paralysis and Heroism 
Subtitle: Deliberation, Decision, and the Crisis in Darfur 
Abstract: 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on political judgment by proposing that the 
faculty of judgment is essential for responsibly coping with the undeniable fact of distant 
suffering and the controversial duty of humanitarian intervention. To achieve this end, 
Mahmood Mamdani’s text ‘The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’ will be 
mobilized for a constructive dialogue about which specific conception of political judgment is 
at stake when we debate a situation like Darfur today. The main claim is that political 
judgment in times of acute crisis requires the members of the public sphere to strike a 
precarious balance between two contradictory impulses: the deliberative impulse to enlarge 
the pool of particular standpoints, and the decisionist impulse to finally bring the conversation 
to a halt and adopt a normative stance. The theoretical framework for this balanced view of 
the faculty of judgment will be articulated through a hybridization of Hannah Arendt’s notion 
of an ‘enlarged mentality’ and Jacques Derrida’s concept of an ‘aporetic decision’. 
Keywords: Arendt, Darfur, Derrida, decision, deliberation, genocide, Mamdani, political 
judgment; 
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I. Introduction 
For almost a generation of scholarly research, the notion of judgment has been scoring high in 
political theory’s economy of attention. Starting with Ronald Beiner’s groundbreaking work, 
and, for the time being, culminating in Alessandro Ferrara’s grand récit of the force of the 
example, the notion of judgment transformed itself into a magnifying glass through which 
fundamental problems for contemporary political theory, from citizenship to racism and the 
nature of evil, could be thrown in sharp relief.
1
 
Against any attempt to safeguard the legitimacy of political action by referring to uniform 
principles of justice or to ideal conditions of communication, the notion of judgment pays 
special tribute to the singularity of the situation. If anything can be said to be uniting the 
diverse approaches to judgment in terms of a common denominator, it is a deep-seated 
aversion to theories and ideologies that engage norms as abstract and context-insensitive.
2
 
The legitimacy of political action must, according to the defenders of judgment, necessarily 
be understood as emerging from agonistic encounters between particular standpoints. 
Following Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’, influentially reinterpreted by Hannah Arendt, 
political judgment triggers a ‘reflective’, as opposed to a ‘determinant’, activity, rising from 
the singularity of the situation to a general claim that is categorically dissimilar from abstract 
and context-insensitive norms. 
This paper aims to contribute to the already vast corpus of scholarly research by proposing 
that the faculty of judgment is essential for responsibly coping with the undeniable fact of 
distant suffering and the controversial duty of humanitarian intervention. ‘La question 
humanitaire’3, as Luc Boltanski has dubbed it, cannot be silenced by today’s most affluent 
and powerful societies. Nowhere has this challenge become more ferocious than on the 
African continent. For the past five years, the conflict in the Sudanese province Darfur has 
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been the object of debates about the appropriateness of humanitarian intervention.
4
 There 
seems to be a broad consensus in the Western hemisphere that something needs to be done to 
stop the blood-shed. 
Yet, there is far less agreement on the scope, the means, and the agents of a possible 
humanitarian intervention.
5
 At the root of this sharp disagreement lies clearly that no accord 
has been reached on the most basic question: Which term is appropriate to characterize the 
conflict in Darfur? Since different labels obviously result in different obligations and 
entitlements to act—an ongoing genocide puts much more pressure on the global community 
to disregard the equal sovereignty of a state than an insurgency or a civil war—it is of 
paramount importance to examine the manifold registers through which the representation of 
violence is played out.
6
 
While it is uncontested that any representation of violence remains implicated in processes of 
judgment, I shall, moreover, submit that we need to trade off the twin requirements that 
political judgment imposes on us: enlargement (or deliberation), and closure (or decision). 
The main claim of this paper is that political judgment in times of acute crisis forces the 
members of the public sphere to strike a precarious balance between two contradictory 
impulses: the deliberative impulse to increase the pool of particular standpoints, and the 
decisionist impulse to bring the conversation to a halt and adopt a normative stance. When 
distant suffering is witnessed and humanitarian intervention pondered, weighing the 
deliberative impulse against the decisionist one becomes crucial, because, if advocated in 
isolation of each other, both the plea for enlargement and the plea for closure reveal grave 
disadvantages. Should the deliberative impulse prevail completely over the decisionist one, 
the danger of paralysis looms: due to an unconditional endorsement of the merits of 
deliberating, the capacity to stop the discussion so as to finally take a stand is undermined. 
[3] 
 
Should, on the other hand, the decisionist impulse prevail completely over the deliberative 
one, the danger of heroism looms: due to an unconditional endorsement of the merits of 
deciding, the distinction between productive and unproductive paths of decision-making gets 
blurred. 
On the conceptual level, these impulses are in fact irreconcilable, for the notion of judgment 
contains, as I shall indicate in more detail below, two layers of meaning that point in rival 
directions. The first layer defines judging as an activity that is best performed by the 
backward-looking, detached role of the ‘spectator’; the second layer defines judgment as an 
activity that is best performed by the forward-looking, engaged role of the ‘actor’. We may 
call this the ‘dual core’ of the notion of political judgment. The bulk of the paper aims at 
unraveling this dual core, by demonstrating that any account of political judgment that puts 
too much interpretive weight on one layer of meaning, without acknowledging the 
countervailing force of the other, ultimately does not succeed in delivering a plausible 
analysis of the faculty of judgment. 
However, since the article wishes to go beyond scrutinizing political judgment on the 
conceptual level alone, I shall provisionally devise an institutional solution to the dilemma of 
these irreconcilable impulses. This solution, which will only be hinted at, draws on the idea 
that, in times of acute crisis like Darfur today, an imperfect compromise about what to 
perceive (the performance of the spectator) and what to do (the performance of the actor) can, 
and indeed must, be crafted. Such a compromise might come into being provided that the 
public sphere transforms itself into a space for agonistic encounters between citizens who 
mutually recognize each other as equal participants in the same process of exercising 
reflective judgment. 
[4] 
 
In what follows, I begin by focusing on an assessment of the situation in the Sudanese 
province that effectively calls into question the ambitions, claims, and motives of many 
Western commentators and practitioners. Mahmood Mamdani’s article ‘The Politics of 
Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’7 can be read as a piece of civic engagement, 
geared towards the general public. My ultimate interest in reviewing this account of judgment 
is to make sense of a wider set of concerns about the cosmopolitan disposition of 
contemporary liberalism.
8
 This backdrop is the reason why I treat the above-mentioned article 
symptomatically, as indicative of a larger class of skeptical reservations about moralizing and 
depoliticizing responses to ‘la question humanitaire’. 
The paper has the following structure: I will start (II) by summarizing Mamdani’s argument 
and uncovering some consequences that remain largely hidden in the text itself. The next step 
(III) shall lead me to distinguish between valuable and less valuable lessons that Mamdani’s 
critique might offer to a theory of political judgment. In the following section (IV), I will 
introduce Hannah Arendt’s notion of an ‘enlarged mentality’ and Jacques Derrida’s concept 
of an ‘aporetic decision’ in an attempt to redeem the faculty of judgment in times of acute 
crisis. Finally (V), I shall put forth the claim that a hybridization of Arendt’s and Derrida’s 
insights into the nature of political judgment can help us establish a theoretically satisfactory 
link between empirical knowledge and normative stance.
9
 
II. Against Interventionism 
The article’s title already foreshadows the general line of the argument. Mamdani submits that 
it is vital for the proponents of an intervention to attach the label ‘genocide’ to the atrocities in 
Darfur. The ideology-critical questions Mamdani asks with regard to this nominal distinction 
determine the further progress of his investigation: ‘Who does the naming? Who is being 
named? What difference does it make?’ (1) In Mamdani’s view, answers to these questions 
[5] 
 
are essential for understanding the true character of the campaign for Darfur. The widespread 
use of words like ‘genocide’ or ‘African holocaust’ is motivated by the desire to portray the 
conflict in such a way that any judgment as to what reaction on behalf of the Western world 
would be necessary becomes unambiguous. If the reports are correct and the conflict 
identifiable as genocidal, there will be no place for a reasonable discussion about what means 
should be employed—a humanitarian intervention is then imperative. Mamdani, however, 
suspects that the link between empirical knowledge and normative stance in the case of 
Darfur is severely defective. 
Mamdani’s search for the agents behind the process of naming aims at disclosing the power 
structures behind the seemingly disinterested appeal to moral obligations in times of 
emergency. Consequently, he turns to the American media to analyze their illustration of the 
situation in Darfur. By carefully combing through the various death tolls that the New York 
Times has assembled—the estimations range between 10 000 and 100 0000 dead people 
every month, apparently without any change in evidence—Mamdani suggests that journalists 
are at best guessing numbers, at worst they skillfully adjust their estimations to the mood of 
the readership. A longer quotation sums up Mamdani’s standpoint: 
This voyeuristic approach accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to 
obscure the politics of the violence and position the reader as a virtuous, not just a 
concerned observer. […] Even when newspapers highlight violence as a social 
phenomenon, they fail to understand the forces that shape the agency of the 
perpetrator. Instead, they look for a clear and uncomplicated moral that describes the 
victim as untainted and the perpetrator as simply evil. Where yesterday’s victims are 
today’s perpetrators, where victims have turned perpetrators, this attempt to find an 
African replay of the Holocaust not only does not work but also has perverse 
[6] 
 
consequences. Whatever its analytical weaknesses, the depoliticisation of violence has 
given its proponents distinct political advantages. (5) 
Mamdani accuses the campaign for Darfur of obfuscating its political background by 
presenting the conflict in a Manichean manner. Consequently, the outrage of the public can be 
channeled at limited group of perpetrators: the distorted image of the conflict makes it appear 
as if the violence were exclusively committed by ‘Arabs’ against ‘Africans.’ This one-sided 
attribution of blame unduly simplifies the complexity of a situation in which perpetrators and 
victims are not always easy to hold apart. Mamdani argues that this tactics of moralization is 
intentional to the effect that it serves the purpose of certain agents who pursue an agenda 
framed by the global ‘war on terror.’ In the end, Mamdani contends that the imperialism of 
the US is the driving factor behind the campaign for Darfur.  
Moreover, Mamdani notes that ‘[i]t seems that genocide has become a label to be stuck on 
your worst enemy, a perverse version of the Nobel Prize, part of a rhetorical arsenal that helps 
you vilify your adversaries while ensuring impunity for your allies.’ (6) Sometimes the 
situation in Darfur is also compared to the case of Rwanda where the failure to take steps on 
the part of the West eventually triggered a catastrophe.
10
 But Mamdani again repudiates the 
lesson that some interventionists seek to set up in likening Darfur today to Rwanda in 1994 by 
replying that it would be myopic to forget about the military involvement of the US through 
proxies in the civil war in Rwanda.
11
 In contrast to foreign interference, Mamdani proposes 
internal ‘power-sharing arrangements’ (8) through which the dynamic of peace-building can 
slowly take off. While contemporary interventionism under the banner of the ‘responsibility 
to protect’ repeats the history of colonial domination, fostering solidarity discloses a more 
promising route to pacify the warring parties.
12
 Analytically, Mamdani endorses an approach 
to the conflict that remains sensitive to contextual conditions. The high-pitched rhetoric of 
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those who push for a ‘genocide case’ in Darfur obstructs any attempt to capture the specificity 
of the aggression. The language of moral blame forces upon us a dichotomy of pure victims 
vs. pure perpetrators that is, in Mamdani’s view, too impoverished to help us describe and 
evaluate the situation. As a remedy against the populist yearning, Mamdani proposes the 
political language of differentiated types of victimhood and perpetration. 
However, these observations are not only relevant for the particular event of Darfur. They 
also raise key issues connected to the problem of political judgment in general because 
Mamdani grapples with the campaign for Darfur on two levels: First and explicitly, he 
speculates about the agents behind it, the media and lobby groups that allegedly have a stake 
in making the case for a military operation credible. In this respect, Mamdani employs the 
usual instruments of a hermeneutics of suspicion to unveil the vested interests of certain elites 
caught up in the global ‘war on terror’.13 Yet, on a second, more latent plane Mamdani 
concentrates on the effect on the public at the receiving end of the campaign’s actions. It is 
with respect to this public that Mamdani’s remarks are most disconcerting since they touch 
upon a pattern of reaction that can pose a serious threat to democratic societies. While 
consuming the extensive news coverage about the conflict in Darfur many citizens of Western 
countries are, following Mamdani’s account, being manipulated. But this is not the end of the 
story. We can discover in Mamdani’s text an insinuation at the necessity of, and even the 
longing for, such a manipulation. Citizens of Western societies who consider themselves 
connected to the world beyond the territorial boundaries of their nation states actually want to 
be dealing with a one-sided depiction of catastrophes. 
One reason for this desire to be deceived is simply that citizens normally do not have the 
means to verify, let alone gather, the information on which their standpoints vis-à-vis distant 
suffering is based. With regard to this reliance on information that cannot be confirmed 
[8] 
 
directly, we are not merely passive objects of manipulation by some dark forces; for it is 
undoubtedly the case that we sometimes find comfort in the fact that there are clear-cut and 
uncontroversial distinctions between perpetrators and victims. It is this comfort that Mamdani 
has in mind when he talks about the ‘virtuous reader’ who tries to develop an opinion on 
Darfur, while steering clear of any deep-reaching interrogation of the conflict’s background. 
To know right from wrong, to separate good from evil deeds, to pinpoint the perpetrators and 
to sympathize with the victims—all these forms of judgment seem like natural dispositions; 
yet in the case of distant suffering they do also conveniently feed into the self-perception of 
Western citizens as being aware of, and sensitive to, the horrible disasters around them.
14
 The 
really troubling issue in Mamdani’s text is, therefore, that the longing for clarity might 
paradoxically impede or corrupt the representation of facts. Only polar and schematic 
categories such as the opposition between ‘good Africans’ and ‘evil Arabs’ allow for an 
interpretation of the conflict in which the reader can cultivate the peculiar sentiment of 
virtuosity, by feeling at the same time connected to the world and secure from the horror of 
distant suffering.
15
 
III. Lacking a Certain Sense of Tragedy 
The less we know, the stronger our convictions: obviously, this should not be a desirable 
model for the relation between empirical knowledge and normative stance. What I have called 
a paradoxical feature of many debates about humanitarian intervention—the intertwining of a 
longing for clarity with a misrepresentation of facts—clearly demands correction. But the 
question remains open whether Mamdani’s text can bring such a correction about, beyond the 
deconstructive undertaking of a hermeneutics of suspicion. I do not mean to attach little value 
to the enterprise of casting doubt on the campaign for Darfur. For the argument’s sake, I will 
assume that the manner in which the discussion is orchestrated at the moment is problematic. 
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However, I suggest scrutinizing in detail Mamdani’s antidote against the predominant 
discourse of moralizing and depoliticizing. 
I believe that Mamdani’s more complex and differentiated conception of victimhood and 
perpetration appears, in the present form of the article, underdetermined for the following 
reason: It does not take into account that any representation of facts upon which a particular 
normative stance builds is constrained by the action-based aspect of judgment. Generally 
speaking, when the faculty of judgment is exercised in moments such as Darfur today, a 
twofold process is set in motion: We need to (i) describe and evaluate a situation at a given 
time and (ii) act upon the outcome of this description and evaluation. Mamdani dedicates a lot 
of polemical energy to the first element of judgment, by stipulating that the dichotomy 
between pure victims and pure perpetrators is inept to conceive of the specificity of the 
conflict. Since he does not qualify his call for more complexity and differentiation, however, 
he fails to properly address the second element.
16
 
It is easy to see why this failure might jeopardize political judgment. If the need to act upon 
choices is neglected or ignored, the faculty of political judgment can become fatally 
paralyzed. By paralysis I mean the state of mind we find ourselves in when we are under the 
ongoing impression of overlooking something essential. We might then be tempted to 
permanently say to ourselves that it is still too early to come to a conclusion and thus 
postpone adopting a normative stance in a discussion. The unqualified proposal that there is 
more to know, more to understand, more to include in our perspectives on the conflict in 
Darfur can lead to precisely such a paralyzing condition. 
To properly diagnose this kind of paralysis, we need to highlight again the dual core of 
political judgment. Judging involves the backward-looking, detached role of the spectator as 
well as the forward-looking, engaged role of the actor. Accordingly, we might add that 
[10] 
 
decreeing a verdict can only be done after the deed; yet taking a stand in social affairs requires 
from us the readiness to decide now. These semantic layers pull the concept in rival 
directions. The faculty of judgment, thus, instigates two operations that are at once reliant on, 
and in conflict with, each other.
17
 
To distinguish between description/evaluation and action does not imply that we can easily 
separate these activities. Political judgment cannot always be neatly split up in a binary 
opposition between detachment and engagement.
18
 The politics of naming during an acute 
crisis, brilliantly unmasked by Mamdani, is emblematic of how the spectator and the actor are 
intimately tied up with each other. As the syndrome of the virtuous reader epitomizes, being a 
spectator of distant suffering often means being complicit in a scheme for imperial control. 
But this insight into the interconnectedness of spectator and actor in reality still allows for an 
instructive splitting into ideal types. Hence, the spectator and the actor are introduced here as 
heuristic devices whose purpose is to accentuate the intricate character of political judgment; 
they are enlisted in this context as conceptual catalysts through which the competing forces 
within the faculty of judgment can be unpacked.
19
 
This reflection gives rise to the problem of how a holistic understanding of political judgment 
should conceive of the antagonistic relation between spectator and actor.
20
 While both 
elements culminate in the faculty of judgment, it appears that, in his reply to the Save Darfur 
campaign, Mamdani burdens the spectator with so much responsibility to represent the 
situation correctly that the actor’s ability to choose what to do is thereby undermined. The 
virtue of detachment is celebrated to the extent that engagement, apart from the (certainly 
important, yet ultimately insufficient) gesture of deconstruction, becomes almost 
inconceivable. 
[11] 
 
A poignant phrase by Ronald Beiner elucidates what is missing in Mamdani’s critique: a 
certain sense of tragedy. Beiner writes that ‘[tragic judgment] continually confronts a reality it 
can never fully master but to which it must nonetheless reconcile itself’21. It is the tension 
between ‘never fully mastering’ and ‘nonetheless reconciling’ that I would locate at the heart 
of judgment. Mamdani convincingly exposes the obstacles we face while trying to make sense 
of the situation in Darfur, yet he downplays the impact of accommodating our ever so 
imperfect accounts of this very situation. That is why the action-based aspect of judgment 
remains in limbo until its tragic dimension is brought to the fore. 
At this stage, a caveat seems necessary. It might be demurred that Mamdani does not at all 
underestimate or deny the relevance of political action in Darfur. What he instead advocates is 
that political action must not always be equated with humanitarian intervention. This 
objection is valid to a certain degree, but it misses the issue I would like to raise, namely that 
Mamdani does not properly account for the tragic dimension inherent in political judgment. I 
wish to maintain that this dimension remains unacknowledged by any theory that opposes, 
without further qualifications, simplistic representations of violence with more complex and 
differentiated approaches. As I shall expound in the last section of the paper regarding the use 
of the word ‘genocide’, this opposition is itself treacherous, because it misconstrues the 
structure of deciding. Whereas Mamdani’s analysis exhibits a flaw, it is, however, not 
irreparable. Instead of rejecting his suggestions altogether, I will in the next section attempt to 
redeem his lopsided view of political judgment by reading together Hannah Arendt’s notion 
of an ‘enlarged mentality’ and Jacques Derrida’s concept of an ‘aporetic decision’.22 
IV. Arendt and Derrida: The Dialectic between Enlargement and Closure 
Before we go into the details of this comparison, I have to further clarify my approach to 
these authors. As will soon become clear, neither Arendt nor Derrida envisage the faculty of 
[12] 
 
judgment exactly the way I suggest it should be seen. The rationale for selecting Arendt and 
Derrida as the pillars of my argument is that, nevertheless, each thinker reveals one crucial 
quality of political judgment.
23
 Thus, I use these authors with a view to create an illustrative 
contrast between the two layers of meaning inherent in political judgment. The notion of an 
‘enlarged mentality’ will be enlisted to highlight the force of the deliberative impulse, 
whereas the concept of an ‘aporetic decision’ will be enlisted to highlight the force of the 
decisionist impulse. I undoubtedly take some liberty in interpreting Arendt and Derrida 
against the grain. Yet, this method can be instrumentally justified by considering the initial 
question from which this essay has taken off: what kind of political judgment should we 
employ while witnessing distant suffering and pondering humanitarian intervention? 
Hannah Arendt’s reflections on judgment are valuable to this debate, because they enable us 
to think about an enlargement of singular viewpoints. Jacques Derrida’s ideas about decision, 
on the other hand, are equally seminal because they remind us why it is impossible to 
eliminate the injustice, and even violence, involved in every decision. Still, and this explains 
why I would insist on cross-pollinating their insights, not only Arendt, but also Derrida adhere 
to somewhat extreme positions, which call for moderation. Exploiting the metaphor of 
political judgment’s dual core, I shall propose that combining the respective advantages in 
Arendt’s and Derrida’s accounts allows us to pay the same amount of attention to the 
spectator and to the actor. The aim of this exegetic exercise is not to proffer a deceptively flat 
response to ‘la question humanitaire’, as if the Janus-faced disposition of political judgment 
could ever be smoothly synthesized. Rather, I seek to contemplate how the call for more 
complexity and differentiation can be complemented with an account of closure that does not 
automatically fall back on simplistic representations of violence. 
How Far Does an Enlarged Mentality Reach? 
[13] 
 
To start with our primary source of inspiration, Arendt famously turned to Kant’s ‘Critique of 
Judgment’ when developing her own theory of political judgment.24 In bringing the individual 
faculty of taste and the collective nature of politics in conjunction, she anchored her theory in 
the relation between the subject’s particularity and its judgment’s appeal to universality.25 The 
Kantian notion of taste is essential to Arendt’s endeavor because it denies what is ordinarily 
perceived as the idiosyncratic character of judgments of beauty. Kant, to be sure, holds the 
view that judgments of beauty are based on personal feelings of pleasure or displeasure; yet 
they are not subjective in the normal sense of ‘incommensurable’ for they always strive for 
broad validity. If I maintain that object X is beautiful, as opposed to merely agreeable, I 
cannot but demand consent from other people. Therefore, judgments of beauty always entail 
an assumption about their potential generalizability. 
This feature, at first sight, draws them nearer to the sphere of morals where potential 
generalizability functions as a test for assessing the permissibility of specific actions.
26
 What 
distinguishes aesthetic judgments not only from verdicts about what is good but also from 
logical reasoning, however, is that we do not possess a concept under which object X could be 
subsumed. The ‘Critique of Judgment’ introduces a distinction between ‘reflective’ and 
‘determinant’ modes of judgment that is crucial for Arendt’s project. In Kantian terminology, 
aesthetic (but also teleological) judgments are based on reflection: what is given is the 
particular from which the universal must be inferred. In contradistinction to reflective 
judgments, determinant judgments subsume the particular under a universal which is already 
given.
27
 The differentia specifica of aesthetic judgments, hence, lies in an appeal to 
universality that is not based on a pre-established rule or principle. We do not have a rule or a 
principle at our disposal, from which we could simply deduce the beauty of object X. 
Determinant judgments, on the other hand, refer to a pre-established rule or principle so as to 
confirm or refute its applicability in a special instance.
28
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The lack of a concept, under which a particular could be subsumed, separates aesthetic 
judgments even more from logical reasoning where the argument is compelling by way of 
referring to truth. Judgments of beauty do not compel others to agree, as Kant emphasizes, for 
the claim to universality implicated in aesthetic judgment is made possible by common sense, 
not by pure reason.
29
 In addition, taste is a matter of discussion: it must be communicable and 
open to debate. The best way to achieve this is to employ an ‘enlarged mentality’ (erweiterte 
Denkungsart). Kant’s definition of an enlarged mentality is ‘putting ourselves in the position 
of everyone else’. For judgments of beauty to be both subjective—as opposed to the objective 
knowledge generated by pure reason—and impartial—in contrast to the relativism of De 
gustibus non est diputandum—it is indispensable to endow the judging person with this 
ability to think representatively. The validity of a proposition regarding beautiful objects can 
be secured because it has an exemplary status. For Arendt, thinking representatively has 
massive relevance for politics: 
That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted 
by Kant, namely the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but in 
the perspective of all those who happen to be present; even that judgment may be one 
of the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to 
orient himself in the public realm, in the common world—these are insights that are 
virtually as old as articulated political experience. […] The difference between this 
judging insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we 
usually call common sense, which the latter transcends. Common sense […] discloses 
to us the world insofar as it is a common world. […] Judging is one, if not the most, 
important activity in which this sharing-the world-with-others comes to pass. What, 
however, is quite new in Kant’s propositions in the Critique of Judgment is that he 
discovered this phenomenon precisely when he was examining the phenomenon of 
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taste and hence the only kind of judgments which, since they concern merely aesthetic 
matters, have always been supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the 
domain of reason.
30
 
The fact that we share the world with others is a condition of possibility of political judgment. 
To train our imaginative prowess in the public realm will only work if we acknowledge the 
world as a common one. The enlarged mentality of the subject needs to be linked to the 
(imagined or real) presence of others from whom agreement to particular judgments can be 
elicited. We can rise above idiosyncrasies only if we place ourselves in the position of those 
who inhabit and negotiate a common world with us. The goal of this endeavor is to reach a 
point where impartiality is not imposed as a rule- or principle-governed directive, but rather 
emerges out of civic deliberations and practices of freedom. Thinking representatively will, 
therefore, generate political judgments that are, strictly speaking, neither subjective nor 
objective. Their validity will be guaranteed by the ‘incessant talk’31 among the members of 
the public sphere. 
Another idea that Arendt imports from Kant’s aesthetic writings concerns the cognitive status 
of the speech acts circulating in the public sphere. The faculty of judgment is, on Arendt’s 
account, not predicated on truth claims. To assert that opinions constitute the fabric of politics 
is clearly a departure from the Platonic mainstream in Western political thought. In a well-
known passage, she notes: 
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making 
present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent, that is, I represent them. 
This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who 
stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; 
this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or feel like somebody else, 
[16] 
 
nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own 
identity where actually I am not. The more people’s standpoints I have present in my 
mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would 
feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusion, my opinion.
32
 
The tension between Arendt’s repudiation of truth claims and her insistence on the broad 
validity of political judgments has evoked harsh disapproval from otherwise sympathetic 
readers. Perhaps most famous among them, Jürgen Habermas rejected Arendt’s model on the 
grounds that the faculty of judgment cannot provide a ‘cognitive fundament’ for settling 
controversies, for it abstains from providing us with a measure to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate standpoints in the public realm.
33
 
Though I will not enter into this protracted debate, suffice it to say that these critics 
sometimes misunderstand the pivotal role Arendt assigns to pluralism and disagreement in her 
theory of politics.
34
 To emancipate politics from the grip of truth claims has, in her view, not 
the effect of idealizing decisionism, quite on the contrary. This means that opinions must 
remain open to contestation in exactly the same manner that judgments of beauty need to 
satisfy the criterion of being communicable. Putting the formation and exchange of opinions 
at the centre of attention does, consequently, not comprise the assumption that ‘anything 
goes’.35 Rather, Arendt submits that truth claims would, due to their compelling nature, stifle 
civic deliberations and practices of freedom. Dissent would be rendered impossible once 
politics fell under the reign of truth.
36
 Arendt’s motive for shifting away from the monological 
authority of truth claims to the broad validity of opinions derives from the concern, as Linda 
Zerilli puts it, ‘how to save freedom in the face of our deep sense of necessity in human 
affairs’.37 
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If these ideas resonate, to the inclined reader, with Mamdani’s call for more complexity and 
differentiation, the following reflections hope to show that a blind spot in Arendt’s model 
actually correlates with Mamdani’s overemphasis on the spectator. Arendt’s original 
contribution to the discussion of political judgment is to be found in her appropriation of the 
Kantian vision of an ‘enlarged mentality’. What she, however, does not register is the risk of 
an enlarged mentality effectively crippling our capacity to adopt a normative stance.
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Arendt’s proposal contains no guidelines as to what commitment the imperative of 
enlargement actually demands of the judging subject: In case she is obliged to hypothetically 
include all the standpoints before a judgment is made, it is hard to see how any sense of 
individuality could be retained during this process. Affirming all the available standpoints 
would render political judgment tame, diffuse, and aimless. The individual perspective would 
probably dissolve in a neutral ‘view from nowhere’39, and this is undoubtedly not an outcome 
Arendt welcomes. 
With an eye on the dispute over Darfur, Arendt’s focus on the public sphere as the space 
where opinions are formed and exchanged is attractive, because it envisages plurality not as 
an eliminable threat, but as a necessary condition of the faculty of judgment. Besides, her 
insistence on the reflective, as opposed to determinant, nature of political judgment, permits 
us to recognize the importance of paying close attention to the background of the erupted 
violence: if judging is essentially an activity that always begins with the particular, without 
relying on a pre-established rule or principle, it follows that context-sensitivity with regard to 
the situation under scrutiny becomes paramount. 
While I believe that Arendt’s concept of an enlarged mentality hits advocates of a cognitivist 
fundament for politics where it hurts most, I want to maintain that one can, and indeed should, 
be skeptical of the prerogatives of ‘incessant talk’, without affirmatively reinstituting the 
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monological authority of truth claims. When we witness distant suffering and ponder 
humanitarian intervention, the public sphere cannot only pride itself on being the arena in 
which various representations of violence are discussed; it must also become the forum where 
the responsibility is assumed to finally bring the conversation to a halt and adopt a normative 
stance. Paul Ricœur formulated this critical reservation in the following manner: 
We must not therefore hypostasize the judgment of the spectator, even if it is given to 
the spectator to embrace the scene as a whole, as does, after all, the philosophy of 
universal history. All that we can suggest is that reflection, in bearing on past events, 
reveals its prospective dimension thanks to a critical distancing.
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If we subscribe to the notion that political judgment entails both the backward-looking, 
detached role of the spectator and the forward-looking, engaged role of the actor, it follows 
that the principle of ‘putting ourselves in the position of everyone else’ needs to be 
constrained by the requisite of finally taking a stand. Put negatively, enlargement without 
closure will result in the permanent suspension of the faculty of judgment. The question, then, 
is how we should moderate and weigh the twin requirements of enlargement and closure in 
such a way that the scope of political judgment is neither overstretched nor too narrow. 
How Much Heroism Is Involved in an Aporetic Decision? 
In this part of the paper, I will endeavor to argue that Jacques Derrida’s idea of an ‘aporetic 
decision’ allows us to continue our path towards a balanced view of political judgment.41 This 
is the case because Derrida proposes an approach to closure that exhibits great sensitivity to 
the injustice, and even violence, of any decision. 
Before I carry on, I must at least minimally spell out my standing vis-à-vis the controversy 
over Derrida’s work. Many a criticism has been leveled against deconstruction’s somewhat 
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confusing relation with ethics and politics: from nihilist impotence to fascist endorsement, the 
spectrum of accusations is wide.
42
 Contrary to these polemical attacks, my starting point will 
be that Derrida’s work is driven and structured by an ethico-political agenda.43 Such a reading 
gains evidentiary momentum once we turn our attention to those writings that explicitly 
grapple with pressing social issues of our times such as contemporary Europe, 
cosmopolitanism, forgiveness, and friendship.
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 While I am not interested in proffering a full-
fledged justification of the claim that ethics and politics occupy a prominent place in 
deconstruction, I will invoke Derrida’s analysis of decision as an exemplar to substantiate this 
claim indirectly. 
The most promising reference text for our purpose is ‘Force of Law’.45 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that this article should be interpreted in analogy to a Socratic apologia of 
deconstruction—as a reply to, and perhaps a rebuttal of, the above-mentioned allegation 
against Derrida’s reckless views on ethics and politics.46 The overarching theme of ‘Force of 
Law’ lies in the tension between law and justice. After some preliminary remarks about the 
extraordinary occasion of addressing an audience in a language other than one’s mother 
tongue, Derrida moves on to identify three aporias within the concept of decision.
47
 The first 
aporia articulates the difference between the faculty of judgment and rule-following.  
To be just, the decision, for example, must not only follow a rule of law or a general 
law but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a reinstituting act of 
interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously existed of the law, as if the judge 
himself invented the law in every case. […] In short, for a decision to be just and 
responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without 
regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to 
reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new 
[20] 
 
and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and 
requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or 
ought to guarantee absolutely.
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This passage demonstrates that there are major areas of contact between Derrida and Arendt, 
because both theorists attempt to dissociate the faculty of judgment as strongly as possible 
from rule-following. Yet, Arendt and Derrida differ in their respective kinds of dissociation. 
For Arendt, the reflective nature of political judgment reveals a sharp rift between logical 
reasoning, where the argument is compelling by way of referring to truth, and an enlarged 
mentality, where the universal appeal is inferred from the exploration of a special instance. 
Derrida, on the other side, does not construe decision and rule as dichotomous. If a judgment 
were absolutely immune against rule-following, we would, on his account, not deem it just, 
either. The relation between judgment and rule is, rather, aporetic in the sense that it can never 
be sufficiently stabilized. Somehow, deciding must be tied back to the realm of rules, but we 
can never define precisely how this should be done. 
The second aporia concerns the relation between decision and undecidability.
49
 Here, Derrida 
stresses that no decision can be issued unless one acknowledges its contingency and 
groundlessness. The faculty of judgment remains pervaded by what Derrida calls, inheriting a 
phrase from Pascal, the ‘mystical foundation of authority’. The paradox ventilated by Derrida 
is that undecidability determines decision-making without undermining it. Any situation 
awaiting a decision is undecidable, because the responsibility owed to the other is unlimited 
and irreducible. Ethical demands are truly unconditional—they cannot, under any 
circumstances, be calculated by a utilitarian or deontological maxim.
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Now, we might be seduced to think of these ethical demands as some remote goals that can 
still be realized, if only we try hard enough to fulfill our duties towards the other. Derrida 
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objects to this train of thoughts that justice does not function as a ‘regulative ideal’, but rather 
as an ‘impossible real’.51 Derrida overturns a central presupposition of Kant’s moral 
philosophy when he maintains that ‘ought implies cannot’.52 At first sight, these two aporias 
appear like the fancy reveries of an escapist mind. How should we ever reach a decision when 
our attempts to judge are persistently frustrated by the fear of inflicting injustice and 
violence? The third aporia offers a response to, but certainly no consolation for, this worry. 
Deciding is a temporal practice, as Derrida makes clear: 
But justice, however, unpresentable it may be, doesn’t wait. It is that which must not 
wait. To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required 
immediately, ‘right away’. It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the 
unlimited conditions of knowledge, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify 
it. And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all 
the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision, as such, 
always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the 
consequence or the effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection 
or this deliberation, since it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or 
politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.
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The central notion in this quotation is ‘interruption’. To decide is to cut short the potentially 
infinite process of information gathering and opinion formation and exchange. A decision 
puts an end to civic deliberations animated by the search for better arguments. It is essential to 
see that Derrida does not raise an empirical claim about human fallibility and epistemic 
indeterminacy when he talks about the way in which urgency and precipitation constrain the 
faculty of judgment. For Derrida, there is a qualitative hiatus separating the events leading to 
a decision and the decision itself. 
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While some critics read this chasm as testimony to Derrida’s flirting with decisionism, it must 
be emphasized that no indication of a politics of pure will can be traced in the text. 
Uncovering insecurities at the heart of decision neither debilitates nor unleashes the faculty of 
judgment.
54
 Being aware of those three aporias rather heightens our alertness to the 
ineluctable injustice and violence we cause whenever we decide, no matter how well 
equipped we are. Thus, Derrida complements the disenchanting observation that all decisions 
are contingent and groundless with a constructive piece of advice.
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Even if the accusations of nihilist impotence and fascist endorsement seem exaggerated, it 
cannot be denied that something like a streak of heroism permeates the ‘Force of Law’. 
Derrida certainly dramatizes the act for decision, in distancing it categorically from any form 
of ‘theoretical or historical knowledge’. The danger intrinsic to this move is that all the 
considerations in preparation of a decision fade into oblivion once the singular moment of 
deciding has arrived. The blind spot in Derrida, therefore, mirrors Arendt’s hyperbolic image 
of enlargement. Derrida’s idea of an ‘aporetic decision’ lets the forward-looking, engaged role 
of the actor obliterate the spectator’s accomplishments. Whereas this account of closure is 
receptive to the inevitable risk and reality of exclusion, it does not provide us with any 
orientation mark to evaluate different trajectories of decision-making. 
From Derrida’s perspective, it is futile to establish a meaningful distinction between the 
public product of representative thinking and the private outcome of eccentric conjecturing, 
for we finally face the same, insoluble quandary of acting in accordance with ethical 
demands. Richard Bernstein, in an essay on forgiveness, outlines this problem succinctly: 
Derrida makes us acutely aware that decisions and responsibility cannot be justified—
if by justification we mean that we have necessary and sufficient reasons for doing 
what we decide to do. In this sense knowledge does not justify decisions. […] But it is 
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one thing to say that there is and can be no rule, no algorithm to which we can appeal 
in making decisions, and it is something very different to say that we simply have to 
face the abyss of impossibility to making a decision. […] Even if we acknowledge the 
‘in-between’ of decision as a space defined by ‘contradictory injunctions’, we struggle 
to negotiate this space in order to come up with the best possible decision in concrete 
circumstances. At times Derrida seems to acknowledge this. But this negotiation 
means that we are required to make careful discriminating judgments—to evaluate 
pros and cons to consider what is relevant to this particular situation. This is a 
deliberative process.
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The suggestion that there are substantively disparate ways of grappling with the aporias of 
deciding is indeed difficult to defend if we solely rely on Derrida’s ideas. But it is vital to 
realize that Bernstein’s objection must not be mistaken for the far more common, and less 
refined, accusation of Derrida’s espousal of decisionism and a politics of pure will. Despite 
the understandable urge to collapse these two strands of criticism, I would surmise that it is 
feasible to abrogate the heroic streak in Derrida’s attack on reflection and deliberation and 
still benefit from his concept of decision. 
V. Beyond Paralysis and Heroism 
The design of my presentation naturally suggests an adjustment of the advantages in Arendt 
and Derrida. My argument is, hence, that combining the Arendtian imperative of enlargement 
with the Derridian approach to closure puts us in a position to tentatively speak of a balanced 
view of political judgment. Arendt helps us to conceive of the deliberative negotiations that 
validate subjective opinions. Derrida allows us to be vigilant of the injustice, and even 
violence, on which any decision rests. This is, of course, not to declare that we could ever 
integrate the twin requirements of deliberation and decision into a harmonious picture. The 
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tension between enlargement and closure remains a persistent facet of the faculty of judgment 
that cannot simply be erased or overcome. As claimed earlier, I believe that the deliberative 
impulse and the decisionist one are, on the conceptual level, irreconcilable. 
But this fact should not be seen as license to let the plea for enlargement prevail over the plea 
for closure (or the other way around). Rather, the centrifugal relation between deliberation 
and decision provides a strong motivator to seek an equilibrium point where an imperfect 
compromise between the spectator and the actor can be crafted. Arendt and Derrida present us 
with tools so as to transform this tension into a state close to such an equilibrium point. That 
is the reason why my strategy of hybridization hopes to boost a balanced, but not remainder-
free, view of political judgment.
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In the last section, I would like to analyze which effects such an equilibrated link between 
deliberation and decision could have on the case of Darfur. My plan is not to provide grounds 
for or against humanitarian intervention.
58
 Instead, I want to investigate under what 
circumstances such grounds can be advanced without falling prey to Mamdani’s hermeneutics 
of suspicion. Arendt and Derrida will serve as philosophical guides in this investigation. 
The indulgence of the ‘virtuous reader’ is certainly going to be shattered by the imperative of 
enlargement. Feeling at the same time connected to the world and secure from the horror of 
distant suffering becomes an option only if political judgment is caught up in parochial self-
complacency. Mamdani is absolutely correct in steering our attention to the vicious circle that 
binds together the media manipulation and the longing for a clear-cut separation between 
perpetrators and victims. The schematic confrontation between ‘evil Arabs’ and ‘good 
Africans’ fails the test of a multilayered and nuanced appraisal. Representative thinking 
produces a remedy to the syndrome of moralizing and depoliticizing that Mamdani sees at 
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work behind the campaign for Darfur, because it obliges each subject to expose itself 
imaginatively to a plurality of standpoints before a judgment is issued.
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Now, the difficulty arises whether Arendt’s repudiation of truth claims holds with regard to 
the widely varying numbers of dead Sudanese that circulate in the newspapers. If we abstain 
from truth claims in the public sphere, do we not frivolously sacrifice the cognitive fundament 
on which debates about the appropriateness of a humanitarian intervention can take place? 
Assessing casualties seems to challenge the deliberative impetus profoundly. Our initial 
impulse is probably to insist that we cannot afford to abandon truth claims in moments of 
utmost exigency such as genocide. Whenever we seek to adopt a normative stance, we 
desperately need more than some unreliable guesses as to how many people have died in a 
conflict. 
Although these reaction patterns are intuitively plausible, it is indispensable to comprehend 
that striving for exemplary validity is, in Arendt’s view, not at all decoupled from getting the 
facts right. To abstain from truth claims in the public sphere does not give the subject carte 
blanche to fantasize about the facts on which judgments build.
60
 Opinions constitute the fabric 
of politics for a specific reason: They render dissent possible. The crux of Arendt’s plea is 
that, despite all the facts being fully visible on the table, there will be no assurance that 
members of the common world actually agree about their interpretation.
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This twist has repercussions for the skepticism towards the notion ‘genocide’. It is hard not to 
be in concord with Mamdani’s observation that marking a conflict as genocide can yield 
symbolic as well as material benefits for the interveners. It is, for instance, timely to study to 
what extent racist prejudice has been playing a role in the designation of almost all recent 
outbursts of aggression in Africa as genocides. The suspicion that some Western 
commentators perpetuate the colonial discourse on the continent as the ‘heart of darkness’ 
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must not be dismissed without serious consideration. If we honestly want to vindicate the 
notion of genocide against the charge that it is exclusively used to occupy the high ground, 
double standards in the application of the label ‘genocide’ must be vigorously unveiled.62 
There is, however, a deeper predicament that cannot be tackled through a hermeneutics of 
suspicion alone. The so called ‘numbers problem’63 refers to the fact that any definition of 
genocide involves, among other things such as clarifying the identity of the victims and 
reconstructing the intention of the perpetrators, a counting of the dead. In order to label a 
conflict as genocide, a certain threshold needs to be passed. Therefore, the beginning of 
Article 2 of the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ 
reads: ‘[G]enocide means […] to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group […].’64 
Whereas there are several questions to be asked about this definition, I would like to focus 
solely on the phrase ‘in whole or in part’.65 It strikes me that, to pronounce in a concrete 
moment whether systematic killings amount to the destruction of a community ‘in whole or in 
part’, necessitates a decision that is simultaneously impossible and real. Does not the very 
thought of organizing the victims into a hierarchy appall our conscience? How dare we to set 
a minimum death toll above which the label ‘genocide’ is justified and below which it is not? 
Are we not left with an arbitrary and unacceptable choice when classifying massacres in terms 
of ‘war crimes’, ‘ethnic cleansings’, or ‘genocidal assaults’?66 
Such doubts lend credence to the speculation that the specter of undecidability haunts any 
decision. One upshot of the numbers problem could be to shy away from political judgment as 
the context of choice seems too diminished. We might, due to the constricted field of vision, 
find ourselves under the ongoing impression of overlooking something essential. But as 
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Derrida has taught us, deciding is a temporal practice that cannot be postponed forever, by 
maintaining that we do not yet know enough to adopt a normative stance. 
In order to unpack the predicament of the ‘numbers problem’, we can draw on yet another 
insight from the ‘Force of Law’. Remember that Derrida insists that any decision must in 
some way break with ‘theoretical or historical knowledge’ to be truly responsible. This 
remark is of paramount importance for the debate about Darfur, because, even if we acquired 
absolute certainty about the death toll, we would still have to deal with the scandalous task of 
quantifying and categorizing casualties. Derrida’s assertion that the temporal practice of 
deciding is contingent, groundless, and unable to furnish itself with necessary and sufficient 
reasons, eminently informs various attempt to define genocide.
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Although it seems accurate to assume that every concrete designation of genocide contains 
elements, such as stipulating a minimum death toll, that defy full vindication, it does not 
follow that all designations are defensible in equal measure. The tragic dimension inherent in 
political judgment does not assimilate all attempts to cope with the undeniable fact of distant 
suffering and the controversial duty of humanitarian intervention. But the very point of 
bringing in political judgment to address ‘la question humanitaire’ is that no rule or principle 
can be established in advance that would permit us to tell which representations of violence 
offer the best possible solutions in a given situation. 
In this respect, the imperative of enlargement can assist us in tailoring our standpoints to the 
specificity of a given situation. The conceptual apparatus sketched by Arendt mitigates the 
excesses of moralization and depoliticization as it stresses the reflective nature of the faculty 
of judgment, running from the particular to the universal. The lack of a concept, under which 
the particular could be subsumed, is one of the characteristic features of aesthetic judgments 
in Kant. Political judgment, in Arendt’s view, is reflective in the sense that it always initiates 
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an examination of the special instance, from which conclusions are drawn that strive for 
exemplary validity. 
In claiming that the definition of genocide requires reflective judgment, I reject the other 
potential option available to us: One could also maintain that checking on the applicability of 
Art. 2 of the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ is 
unavoidably couched in terms of determinant judgment. Thus, my embrace of reflective 
judgment as the mode through which a definition of genocide should be achieved might be 
critiziced for approaching the problem from the wrong side, because only a rule or principle 
could reliably guide our inquiry into different degrees of violence. The desire behind this 
counterargument is far from obscure. Determinant judgment exerts an overwhelming appeal 
to many theorists and practicioners as it assures a certain type of normative validity that flows 
from the authority of the law. The unquestionable identification of victims, objective 
knowledge about the intention of the perpetrators, and a context-transcendent solution for the 
conflict are great promises upon which determinant judgment hopes to deliver. 
However, this hope appears ill-founded and elusive to me. As I believe to have shown, even 
though the duty of humanitarian intervention is already codified in some areas of international 
law, exercising determinant judgment is not an option at all when we witness distant 
suffering, for we simply do not have the universal at our disposal, from which the particular 
could be deduced. The numbers problem attests to the inaccessibility of a pre-established rule 
or principle according to which instances of genocide could be isolated, and it would be much 
more productive for the discussion about Darfur if we focused our energy on striving for 
exemplary validity. For the controversy around the politics of naming this implies shifting 
away from an ‘obsessive legalism’68 about genocide that remains under the spell of 
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determinant judgment. Alessandro Ferrara teases out both the modesty and the allure of 
reflective judgment (or what he calls the ‘new model’): 
If we harness the capacity to free us from the particularity of context to the 
inspiringness of the example rather than the compellingness of the law, we instantly 
lose the ‘objectivity’, reliability, and transmissibility of the older way of conceiving of 
normative validity. […] Therefore there won’t be any guarantee, rather only a weaker 
‘expectation’, that everyone will agree to the labeling of a certain type as the best one 
for that purpose […]. The promise of the new model […] is that of freeing us from the 
twin dangers […] of either trivializing difference, by postulating perfect 
commensuration and translatability in a neutral language, or of jeopardizing 
universalism by failing to reunify the plurality of local contexts and ultimately remain 
hostage to it.
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Evidently, some will object that this train of thought dangerously opens the door to 
decisionism and a politics of pure will. Perhaps, these skeptics will tenaciously point out the 
official justification of the US-led war against Iraq in 2003: Could my argument not be 
applied in support of Colin Powell’s infamous speech in front of the UN Security Council 
where he sought to convince the global community that disarming Iraq from its weapons of 
mass destruction was imminent? Could my argument not be invoked to completely exonerate 
the Bush administration of the false pretense it manufactured, by putting so much weight on 
the ‘tragic dimension’ of judgment? Some champions of the current ‘war on terror’ have 
indeed portrayed the invasion of Iraq as a heavy burden that only a superpower would manage 
to shoulder.
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I think I am capable of recovering my proposal from these challenges, for I have already 
underscored the significance of moderating and weighing the twin requirements—deliberation 
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and decision—political judgment imposes on us. Again, Derrida’s error consists of glorifying 
the act of deciding. His approach to closure underrates the importance of distinguishing 
between productive and unproductive paths of decision-making. That is why we depend on 
the imperative of enlargement to prevent Derrida’s ideas about decision from imprinting too 
much voluntarism on our concept of political judgment. To be sure, awareness of the tragic 
dimension of political judgment will not remove all the qualms about the numbers problem, 
or about the attribution of blame. But it will let the spectator and the actor declare truce, at 
least until the dialectic between enlargement and closure commences again. 
Up until now, I have celebrated the virtue of balancing the two contradictory impulses of 
political judgment, but I have said little about who exactly should be guided by this virtue. 
Although I will not be able to exhaustively elaborate on this issue, I still have to say more 
about the subjects who are supposed to engage in the task of balancing. The argument I want 
to propose bears some resemblance to Habermas’s double-tiered vision of the public sphere.71 
However, whereas I am convinced that the distinction between the informal, weak public 
sphere of opinion-formation and the formal, arranged public sphere of will-formation can 
beneficially inform my proposal, I do not intend to inscribe my argument into Habermas’s 
system of thought. The main reason for this reluctance is that I am advocating an 
interpretation of the informal, weak public sphere that is noticeably more conflictual than 
Habermas would allow. 
In the case under scrutiny, political judgment is concerned with the appropriateness of a 
humanitarian intervention in Darfur. While politicians are eventually responsible for making 
the call, the general public must become the space where deliberation and decision are 
equilibrated. We have to bear in mind that trading off enlargement and closure should not be 
envisioned as a technical difficulty that experts fix in the name of the citizenry. Outsourcing 
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political judgment to a small circle of specialized pundits only exacerbates the syndrome of 
the virtuous reader. Including a plurality of viewpoints, especially from those regions that are 
immediately affected by the conflict, in the discussion about a humanitarian intervention will 
keep crude narratives about perpetrators and victims in check. If room is made for the 
expression of nonconformist and counterhegemonic positions in the public sphere, the 
emphatic campaigners for an intervention in Darfur will have to address the grievances of 
dissenters, who do not deserve to be denunciated as ‘genocide deniers’ from the outset.72 
By firmly staging the dialectic between deliberation and decision within the informal public 
sphere, I do not mean to hypostasize the degree of mandatory consensus. Since closure is 
inescapable, some standpoints will not approve of the chosen course of action. That is why it 
is enlightening to speak of the public sphere as a ‘theatrical’ setting of agonistic encounters.73 
Encounters of this variety are stabilized by the mutual recognition of those citizens who 
together constitute the public sphere. In other words, only if I acknowledge my opponent as a 
legitimate contender in the process of opinion-formation and decision-making shared by all 
citizens, will I be able to admit defeat and to honor victory.
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 A balanced, but not remainder-
free, view of political judgment might, consequently, foster the good of social cohesion by 
promoting two goals: 
On the one hand, to decide, to put an end to uncertainty, to separate the parties; on the 
other, to make each party recognize the share the other has in the same society, thanks 
to which the winner and the loser of any trial can be said to have their fair share in that 
model of cooperation that is society.
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This essay cannot end with a direct, substantial advice as to what should be done about 
Darfur. However, the conditions under which an imperfect compromise can be crafted have 
been identified: To responsibly cope with the undeniable fact of distant suffering and the 
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controversial duty of humanitarian intervention a number of complex operations need to take 
place. I have suggested that these operations can be optimally carried out if we let ourselves 
be guided by a balanced, but not remainder-free, view of political judgment. Starting with the 
most obvious condition that needs to be satisfied to render political judgment in this case 
viable, a deep-reaching investigation of the conflict’s background must inform the public 
debate. It would be a mistake, as Mamdani has reminded us, if the public debate got hijacked 
by partisan campaigners and ideological entrepreneurs whose sole interest lies in attributing 
blame unilaterally. For the public debate to be maximally inclusive, the label of ‘genocide’ 
must under no circumstances be utilized as a perceptional template confining the 
interpretation of reality. 
Yet, approving of a context-sensitive approach to the violence in the Sudanese province does 
not necessarily involve that we give in to the temptation of a hermeneutics of suspicion. When 
issues of global justice are concerned, supporters of a hermeneutics of suspicion deny the very 
possibility of situations where humanitarian interventions could ever be legitimately 
mandated. Resisting this generalized skepticism becomes crucial due to a rather simple 
reason: instances of distant suffering cannot be reasonably denied. This means that the 
appropriateness of humanitarian intervention constitutes indeed a valid, if highly 
controversial, topic for public debate. Conceiving of opinion-formation and decision-making 
through the lens of a conception of political judgment that moves the ‘spectator’ and the 
‘actor’ towards an equilibrium point provides the most suitable framework for structuring this 
debate. 
This brings me to a final note regarding a lacuna in my argument. One of the questions that 
this paper has not sought to answer is the following: what type of institutional arrangements 
would be necessary to secure a democratically legitimate balancing of deliberation and 
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decision? This is, without any doubt, a relevant issue that demands further clarification. 
However, the goal of this essay has consisted of arguing that the need for such a precarious 
balance must be recognized in the first place. I presume, therefore, that an array of 
institutional arrangements shall be compatible with the overall claim I have ventured to 
defend here. 
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